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Good afternoon ladies and gentlemen. I am very pleased to be able to participate in
this cockpit resource management workshop.
As you know, about two years ago the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO) issued an "Accident Prevention Manual." In this manual you can find the
following summary:
'_f the air transport accident rate remains static, and the volume
of air transport continues to grow, the number of accidents each
year will increase. In addition, aircraft size and capacity continue
to escalate. Thus each accident will involve, directly or indirectly,
more and more people and the associated financial (and social)
costs will rise proportionally. If the traveling public is to continue
to regard air transport as having an acceptable safety record, then
the current accident rates must be reduced."
This will not be an easy task. The ICAO Manual also states: '%Vhile the goal of
accident prevention is the elimination of all accidents, the fallibility of human nature
makes this goal unobtainable." However, we must do the best we can. In the future, if
we are to succeed in significantly reducing the accident rate, it will be necessary to go
well beyond simply trying to minimize human error. We must also focus our attention
on all aspects of human nature. (Slide 1)
I would now like to take some time to look back on the safety of aviation. As all of
you know the trend of international air transport accidents has' been shown by ICAO.
(Slide 2)
This chart shows the trend between 1950 and 1980. The figures indicate the number
of passenger fatalities in aircraft accidents for every one hundred million passengers who
fly one kilometer. The fatality rate for 1950 was 1.97 persons. It then declined markedly
to 0.78 in 1960 and to 0.18 in 1970.
The fatality rate for 1975 declined further to 0.08, or one twenty-fifth of the 1950
level. While the overall accident rate has decreased significantly, from 1975 the rate has
leveled off to indicate that different methods and more effective safety methods are
necessary.
There isanother chart that clearlyshows the facts.This chart shows the relative
trendsof accidentsresultingfrom machine causesand from man causes. (Slide3)
We can see that a great change has occurred in the relative percentage between
machine-caused and man-caused accidents. Machine-caused accidents have declined,
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while those caused by man have increased. The decline in machine-caused accidents is a
direct reflection of a remarkable improvement in the performance and reliability of
aircraft equipment.
Indeed, aircraft performance is now approaching the highest possible level of modern
technology. A great improvement can also be seen in hardware, airport facilities, ATC
systems, and so on.
Presenting a sharp contrast is the steady rise in the proportion of man-caused
accidents. This may show that there has not been much improvement in human ability
from olden times. We have spent much time and research to improve our aircraft in
order to make them more reliable, but less efforts and attention have been given to the
officers in the cockpit.
Perhaps some people would say that this accident trend is quite natural, because it
is the cockpit crew which has always been required to perform difficult tasks which
cannot be done by a machine. Therefore, since the most difficult tasks must be
completed by the crew, the machine-caused accidents are low on the chart and the pilot
does not do so well.
At any rate, judging from this chart we can say that it is absolutely necessary for us
to make every effort to eliminate accidents caused by human factors if we are to improve
flight safety performance still further by substantially reducing the aircraft accident
occurrence ratio.
It is generally understood that the effect of measures taken to eliminate accidents
appear suddenly or abruptly. Then the curve tends to level off as time passes. (Slide 4)
As far as flight safety measures are concerned, emphasis has so far been placed on
two points. The one is on improving the reliability of flight equipment by correcting
mechanical defects. The other is on selecting the best-qualified candidates for pilots by
improving the aptitude tests for flight crew candidates. However, even if the best are
selected, it is virtually impossible to keep a pilot constantly in an optimum state in
relation to the aviation system because the systsem changes rapidly as time goes on.
(Slide 5)
It is easier to improve technology than to review and improve human factors. The
result is that the solution to the problem of human factors-related accidents are always
left to the last. As a matter of fact, we must admit that the problems of human factors
have so far been more or less neglected, compared with problems relating to aircraft
technology. Japan Air Lines is no exception. (Slide 6)
In 1977, Japan Air Lines had a DC-8 accident at Kuala Lumpur in Malaysia. The
aircraft involved in this accident had flown from Hong Kong to Kuala Lumpur. The
accident occurred because the captain of the aircraft descended below MDA without
having the runway in sight. He continued the descent until the aircraft struck a hill 260
feet above mean sea level. It was four nautical miles short of the runway threshold.
(Slide 7)
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A subsidiary contributory factor was insufficient instrument monitoring of the
aircraft's flight path by the captainduring adverseweatherconditions,with several
otheraircraft holdingawaitingtheir turn for approach.But a moreimportant factorcan
be said to be the first officer'sfailure to challengethe captain'sbreachof published
companyregulations.
After this accident,the companyset up a committeefor the purposeof studying
overall safety. This Committeewas called the 'ICritical l l Minutes CommitteetL-the
eleven minutes consisting of three minutes after takeoff and eight minutes before
landing. In its studies, the committee discovered that human factors were indeed a major
problem and a cause of accidents. It also found that these problems do not come from or
begin with technical or pilot skill, but stem from:
o Misjudgement
o Lack of knowledge
o Poor crew coordination
o Deviation from standard operating procedures
o Influence from outside factors (Slide 8)
Although this committee pointed out the need for understanding the human factors
involved in the cockpit environment, nothing was done at that time because there was
no concrete way existing to solve the human factor problem.
In 1983, we established a Human Factor analysis group because of a rise in human
error-related accidents and incidents. This analysis group developed a checklist to be
used for all company incidents after the Kuala Lumpur accident. (Slide 9)
We now have 50 cases on file including such items as:
o Taking-off without clearance
o Outboard engine hit runway when landing
o Because of the wet runway condition, an aircraft slipped and a taxiway
light was broken by the nose gear. (Slide 10)
We found that since 1977, when the Critical 11 Minutes Committee was created,
there have been few or no changes made to eliminate the human factor error. We also
found that most of our incidents were caused by:
o Poor crew coordination
o Inadequate briefing
o Failure to use accepted procedures
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o Inadequatecoordinationor timing
o Delayin taking necessaryaction(Slide11)
Up to that time, we had two hull-lossaccidents.Onewasthe Tokyo Bay accident
causedby the captain'smental incapacitation.(Slide 12) The other wasa planethat
overranthe runwayat Shanghaiairport due to a rupture of the airbrakebottle which
causedsomesystemdamage.(Slide13)
A Fault TreeAnalysis(FTA) wasusedfor a detailedanalysisof thoseaccidents.
The Fault TreeAnalysisis basicallya logicdiagramthat attemptsto showthe complex
processesandrelationshipsinvolvedin anaccident.It isadaptedto showthe cause-effect
relationshipsthat induceaccidents.The FTA thus assistsin identifyingand tracingthe
chain-of-eventsthat leadto a systemfailure. (Slide14)
This figure is anexampleof the FTA chartsof our Tokyo Bayaccident.It includes
the symbolscommonlyused in constructingsuch a flow diagramstarting with the
accidentat the top of the pageand workingdownwards.TheFTA canbeconsideredto
progressbackwardsthroughdifferent levelsvia "And" and _)r" gatesin responseto the
question *rWhyV°.The branchesbecomemore detailedas all availableinformation is
addedand leadsto basiccausesor hazards.In our studies,it almostalwaysarrivesat a
commoncause--thatof t_numanerror."
Of course during this period we were also studying for an effective human factors
training program, but because of a lack of aviation psychologists in Japan, we looked
elsewhere for a suitable human factors program. Our search took us everywhere in the
world.
I spoke with many human factors specialists, including government officials and
university, military, and nuclear power human factors specialists. However, we were not
completely pleased with what we saw. We might have given up our search long ago but
we had the great advantage of knowing exactly what we needed.
At that time_ in 1983, ] received a letter from Capt. Carroll explaining the CRM
program developed by United Airlines. The letter stated that Japan Air Lines was facing
the same problem that UAL had in 1979. Capt. Carroll suggested that a cockpit
management training program would be helpful in addressing the problem of safety in
the cockpit.
At the beginning of my own CRM study, I had a basic question about this program
which had been developed by American researchers. Because of cultural differences, I
questioned whether this type of western-style training program could be adapted to the
Japanese way of thinking, especially since the program deals with *_auman behavior"
problems.
Because America is a leading country in the field of behavioral science and there are
so many aviation psychologists and researchers, this dilemma could not be ignored. I
began observing the differences between American and Japanese pilots.
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From my experience of working with American pilots in the UAL public seminars, I
feel that American pilots are more task-oriented than are Japanese pilots. Their behavior
contrasted with the behavior of Japanese pilots at our seminar in Japan where the
Japanese tended to behave in a more group-oriented fashion. (Slide 15)
Therefore, from my study I see America as a task-oriented society. The people seem
more aware of themselves as individuals rather than as part of the group. The American
culture seems to encourage the individual independent self, while the Japanese culture
encourages the development of the dependent group-oriented person.
Japanese modesty is not seen as a virtue in the American culture. In the team
discussions during the CRM seminars, I felt that the Americans did not easily accept
another person's opinion, whereas Japanese tend to accept another person's opinion
whether right or wrong in order to preserve harmony within the group.
Americans will sometimes aggressively support their own opinion, even if they are
not entirely correct, because they are competitive and see the situation in terms of
winning or losing. In contrast, the Japanese will usually become silent and non-
supportive of their own ideas if they see some opposition to them.
Another important point is that Japanese are often conformists who need to identify
with a group. Japanese rarely will try to stand out and be creative in a group situation.
This is because we want to achieve a sense of harmony. It is a part of our history and
our culture. About 1400 years ago a famous Japanese prince called Shotoku Taishi said
'the harmony is to be respected." His words and this thought are still alive in the
Japanese mind.
Of course, the Japanese are also a competitive people. However, they differ from
Americans in that their competition is directed towards an outside group or
organization. While the Japanese are very competitive towards each other in their own
minds, they will never express that competition verbally.
In our Japanese society, acceptance is highly valued and is achieved through a
person's efforts for his group. His efforts, whether useful or not, are seen as his merits
and will earn him respect and promotion even if he has little real ability.
Although I saw those differences in our cultures, I realized that in the cockpit
situation neither the Japanese way of behavior nor the American way are the best.
I don't think that any culture--whether it is Japanese, American, or any other--fits
in with the cockpit environment. And in this sense, cockpit resource management is
culture-free. (Slide 16)
There are many situations where authority is shown in the cockpit. There are also
times that cockpit authority must be questioned or challenged. And it is in this type of
challenge situation that crewmembers react differently based on their cultural
background.
Authority is rarely challenged in a group-oriented society. But as we in the airline
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industry know, this kind of attitude hasled to manyfatal accidents.On the otherhand,
in a task-orientedsocietythosein authority may fail to listen to the opinionof others
whentheir authority is challenged.This too has led to fatal accidents.Let me explain
this throughtheuseof a T_grid."(Slide17)
As I said before, my feeling is that American pilots are task-oriented and Japanese
pilots are mostly group-oriented. Both, of course, have the same goal in mind--that is,
the goal of ultimate safety. (Slides 18 & 19)
Even with the same program and objectives, if the culture is different, there will be
different approaches to the goal. However, the cockpit environment is culture-free so it is
not as important to think of a person's cultural background as it is to think of the
approach to the goal of ultimate safety. Crew members can look at their individual
safety goals and compare them to their own performance to see if their behavior matches
their own safety goals.
After three years of extensive planning and working closely with UAL, we finally
began our in-house CRM-LOFT training program for all crew members. We hope to
have trained all our crew members within two years. We hope, that after applying CRM
to our flight training program that our crew members will realize that the very Japanese
attitude towards authority does not belong in the cockpit environment. (Slide 20)
The cockpit environment must be culture-free in order to obtain our ultimate safety
goal. I think we must first realize how our culture affects our behavior before we can
begin to change our attitude and actions in the cockpit.
And finally ladies and gentlemen, I would like to read this statement from ICAO's
Accident Prevention Manual. (Slide 21)
'_f in the future we are to succeed in significantly reducing
accident rates, we must significantly increase the efforts to
determine and understand the reasons why people behave, act, or
respond in the way they do. Only then can we hope to effect some
fundamental improvements in the safety record."
Thank you very much.
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